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THE NEW NEW-WORLD: VIRTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
"A beginning is the time for taking the most delicate care that the balances are correct."
- Frank Herbert, Dunei
I. INTRODUCTION
David Storey is a lucky young man. In 2004, he was the highest
bidder for a newly discovered landmass known today as Treasure Island.2
He secured the island property, including hunting and mining rights, for
only $26,500.3 Mr. Storey has big plans for the island: "I intend to create a
thriving, fully functional settlement for all to enjoy. ''4 Within less than a
year of his initial investment, Mr. Storey has recouped all of his costs, and
now enjoys profit from his investment.5 While this may sound too good to
be true, it is in fact true, but there is one catch: Treasure Island does not
exist, at least not in the traditional sense. Treasure Island, located off the
coast of a newly discovered continent on the world of Calypso, exists only
on the Internet servers of Project Entropia, an online virtual world
developed by MindArk.6 People from around the real world can go onto
the Internet and collaboratively participate in the three-dimensional,
persistent virtual world of Calypso.7 They can idly adventure around the
land of Calypso, hunting wild animals, pursuing valuable objects, or simply
meeting with friends.8  These adventurers are not limited to what some
would call traditional time-wasting game activities; they can create, buy,
1. FRANK HERBERT, DUNE 3 (1999).
2. Robin Lettice, Property Tycoon Buys Fantasy Island, THE REGISTER, Dec. 17, 2004,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/17/tycoon buysnon existentisland/.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Press Release, Market Wire, Virtual Island-Purchase of $26,500 Recoups Investment in
First Year With Room for Ongoing Profit (Nov. 8, 2005), http://www.marketwire.com/mw/
release html bl?release id=100596.
6. Lettice, supra note 2.
7. See generally Entropia Universe, http://www.entropiauniverse.com/ (last visited Sept. 27,
2006).
8. Id.; see also Entropia Universe, Features, http://www.entropiauniverse.com/
en/rich/5357.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
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and sell virtual property and services on Calypso.9 Players express their
desire for virtual objects just as real-world people express their desire for
real objects-by paying real-world dollars for them.l0
However, Calypso is not the only such world. There are myriad
virtual worlds created by many different software developers. Some
developers of virtual worlds, like MindArk, foster commoditization and
free market exchange in virtual property, while other developers actively
discourage commoditization."l As history has shown, where there is
capital, there is law to protect it.12 For example, the market projected that
virtual goods in 2006 would reach an estimated $2.7 billion. 13 Norrath, an
unintentionally commoditized virtual world, currently has a real-world
gross national product ("GNP") larger than that of the real-world nation of
Bulgaria. 14
As the software and hardware technology that enables virtual worlds
continues to develop, 15 human involvement in those worlds will continue to
develop. 16 Many players spend days on end actively participating in their
virtual world of choice. 17  In fact, a significant number of those players
consider themselves to be dual citizens: citizens of the real world and of the
virtual world. 18 Many earn their living in the virtual world.' 9 Currently,
9. Entropia Universe, Participants Guide, http://www.entropiauniverse.com/
en/rich/5094.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006); see also Features, supra note 8.
10. Entropia Universe, About, http://www.entropiauniverse.com/en/rich/5035.html (last
visited Sept. 27, 2006).
11. See generally Computer and High Tech Law Journal Symposium Rules & Borders-
Regulating Digital Environments: Panel 3-Ownership in Online Worlds, 21 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 807 (2005).
12. See e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952) ("Stealing, larceny, and
its variants and equivalents, were among the earliest offenses known to the law that existed before
legislation.").
13. Knowledge@Wharton, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1302
(last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
14. Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on
the Cyberian Frontier, 2 THE GRUTER INST. WORKING PAPERS ON LAW, ECON. &
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 1, 28 (2001), available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/
viewpdf.cgi?article= 1008&context=giwp.
15. See Peter S. Menell, Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive the
Internet Age?: Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 63, 72-73
(2002) (stating that the amount of transistors per square inch on circuits have doubled and will
continue to do so in the future).
16. Beth Simone Noveck, Institute for Information Law and Policy Symposium State of
Play: Introduction: The State of Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 2 (2004) ("Virtual worlds are the
cyberspace we will 'inhabit' within the next ten years.").
17. F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV.
1,9 (2004).
18. See id.
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many virtual world participants are developing actual property interests in
virtual property, much to the chagrin and delight of virtual world
developers.2 °
In Part II, this Comment will address background principles of society
and law that indicate the need for a legal presence in the online virtual
world game space. Part II will also address the recent historical
developments that have left us at the threshold of this new world and the
litigation virtual worlds will necessitate. A potential analytical framework
will be proposed; this framework is derived from recent virtual-world legal
scholarship, which a court will likely employ to resolve virtual property
rights issues.
In Part III, this analytical framework will be applied to two different
forms of End User License Agreements ("EULA"). These EULAs
encompass two emerging forms of virtual property rights recognition.
First, the analytical framework will be applied to Blizzard Entertainment's
World of Warcraft, a strictly non-commoditized virtual world EULA that
forbids players from developing virtual property expectations. Second, the
analytical framework will be applied to Sony's EverQuest II, a hybridized
approach to the virtual world EULA that grants a limited license to buy and
sell virtual property, while denying participants the right to own the virtual
property outright.
Part IV of this Comment will conclude that American law will soon
enter the virtual world, and if courts apply this analytical framework,
players' and game developers' reasonable expectations regarding virtual
rights should be realized.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Why Virtual Property Rights Are Important
Should legal scholars and courts seriously consider virtual legal
issues? These contentious issues all revolve around games and game play.
People may think games are just games, and require little respect in a
competitive laissez-faire capitalist environment, because the act of game
play does not produce wealth in and of itself. Some people characterize
game players as less valuable members of society and casually disregard
19. See id. at 39 (stating that some users have earned six-figure incomes in virtual worlds).
20. See generally Regulating Digital Environments, supra note 11 (discussing whether the
acquisition of virtual objects can lead to personal property rights).
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players' concerns about their virtual existence.21 How seriously can a court
consider a game player's interest in a virtual item like the "Sword of
Lightning+2"?
The process of developing virtual worlds can be an extremely
profitable enterprise. 22  Millions of people pay to play these games.
23
There is big money to be made from these marginalized gainers.24 The law
will definitely act to protect those moneymaking interests, which run into
the billions of dollars.25 But more importantly, these virtual worlds are
home to millions of people.26 As the world population continues to grow at
an exponential rate,27 and resources become ever scarce in the real world,
the virtual world has become a natural place to serve as a home to all those
who have been squeezed out of the real-world. In the virtual world,
resources are nearly limitless.
28
Due to its intangible nature, analogy is a necessary tool for
understanding the vast potential of the virtual world. The American New
World serves as an effective analogy, because the conditions found in
Europe that produced the mass migration are becoming more prevalent in
the real world. Financial desperation and the search for personal freedom
motivated many to make the long and dangerous trek across the Atlantic to
settle in a hostile and undeveloped land.29 The population of the American
colonies expanded from 4,600 in 1630 to 2,780,400 by 1780.30 There are
similar forces now at work that drive people into the virtual world. The
real world is increasingly expensive, crowded, and legislated. The only
place where many people can experience personal freedom is in the virtual
world, where they can manifest their fantasies and explore the wide-open
expanses that were once commonly available in the real world.
21. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 7.
22. See id. at 8.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual
Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2043 n. 1 (2004).
26. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 9.
27. See generally Paula Abrams, Population Control and Sustainability: It's the Same Old
Song but with a Different Name, 27 ENVTL. L. 1111 (1997).
28. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 47-48.
29. VIRGINIA DEJOHN ANDERSON, NEW ENGLAND'S GENERATION, THE GREAT
MIGRATION AND THE FORMATION OF SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
8-9 (1991).
30. Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations From
Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
405, 457-58 n.248 (2003).
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Confronted by the absence of authority, the New World colonists
claimed personal freedoms for themselves and expressed those freedoms in
the American Constitution and the Bill of Rights to ensure their
persistence. 31 But what is the state of law and human rights in developing
virtual worlds? Again, the analogy to the New World presents itself.
Virtual worlds are essentially corporate colonies where the disenfranchised
pay to exist free from their real-world identities.
Before entering the virtual world, users must sign a EULA and/or a
Terms of Service ("ToS"), which establishes the rights and duties of the
game developer and user.32 Assent to the terms of an online agreement is
the basis of an enforceable contract.33 The asymmetrical balance of
bargaining power between billion-dollar corporations and disenfranchised,
often youthful, individuals is striking, and the contracts between these
parties reflect that asymmetry. 34 The element in the EULA most indicative
of the power asymmetry is the corporate game developer's ability to
terminate the contract and exclude the user from the virtual world at will.
35
Given that the players in these virtual worlds are not merely playing
but living in the virtual space, exclusion from the virtual world amounts to
something between extradition and execution. With the unlimited
discretion found in the EULA signed by all virtual world inhabitants, the
game developers wield extreme power over virtual world inhabitants. The
possible abuse of that power presents a strong invitation for real-world
courts to enter the virtual world.
Examples of abuse are abundant. The Sims Online is not what is
considered a traditional "game world", where players overcome a series of
challenges to achieve a predefined end.36 Instead, it is a virtual world
where participants essentially "hang out."'37 There is no objective designed
by the game developer. Instead, players seem content to earn Simoleons,38
the in-world game currency that is freely exchangeable for real-world
31. See Donald Elfenbein, The Myth of Conservatism as a Constitutional Philosophy, 71
IOWA L. REv. 401,407 (1986).
32. Daniel C. Miller, Determining Ownership in Virtual Worlds: Copyright and License
Agreements, 22 REV. LITIG. 435, 460 (2003).
33. See Compuserve v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1261-62, 1264 (6th Cir. 1996).
34. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 50.
35. Station.com, Sony Online Entertainment, Terms of Service, Section III (10),
http://www.station.sony.com/en/termsofservice.vm (last visited Sep. 29, 52005).
36. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 28.
37. See Charles Herold, Win Friends, Influence People, or Just Aim and Fire, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2003, at G5 ("I played The Sims Online in much the same way that I behave in real life:
hanging out, practicing the guitar and skating by.").
38. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 28, 30.
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currency. 39  Players can earn Simoleons through standard work-related
activities,40 and as players increase their skills at these activities, their
ability to garner wealth increases. 41 Common work-related skills include
entertaining other inhabitants of the virtual world by playing virtual
musical instruments or maintaining attractive virtual houses.42
Unfortunately, a darker side has emerged in the once bucolic virtual
world of The Sims Online. Allegedly, several underage participants in the
virtual world began engaging in explicit online sex chats with adults in
exchange for Simoleons.43 This appears to be a type of virtual child
prostitution.44  Peter Ludlow, a University of Michigan philosophy
professor, styled himself a virtual world reporter and published the
Alphaville Herald, which chronicled newsworthy stories in Alphaville, The
Sims Online's largest city. 45 Ludlow's reports of virtual child prostitution
received some real-world press.46 Electronic Arts ("EA"), The Sims'
publisher, responded by terminating Ludlow's account in The Sims Online.
thereby preventing him from existing or even accessing the virtual world.47
The Sims product line has a long reputation of being family-friendly, with
product releases that eschew traditional video game violence for more
intellectual pursuits, such as city planning.48 This goodwill is valuable to
the product line, and it is clear that EA acted to protect this valuable asset.
It did so under the pretext that his online character profile linked to the
commercial website of the Alphaville Herald, in violation of The Sims'
EULA. 49 This EULA was agreed upon by Ludlow and EA, and the EULA
gives EA the right to terminate user accounts at its discretion.5 °
This is censorship of the highest degree. Returning to the New World
analogy, it would appear that a colony has expelled one of its members
because he or she published information regarding child exploitation that
39. Id. at 38.
40. Id. at 28.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Eric Goldman, Symposium Review: Speech Showdowns at the Virtual Corral, 21
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 845, 846 (2005).
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 847.
47. Id.
48. See Mizuko Ito, Cultural Production in a Digital Age: Mobilizing Fun in the Production
and Consumption of Children's Software, 597 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & SoC. Sci 82, 86-87
(2005).
49. Goldman, supra note 43, at 847.
50. See id.
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was threatening to the economic interests of the colony. The early
American colonists would not tolerate this form of censorship and thus
enshrine the freedom of the press in the First-and possibly most
important-Amendment of the Constitution.5 1 In the Sims example, many
real-world elements of life have been mapped into the virtual world:
52
there is greed, exploitation, and freedom of the press.53 These are real
issues that affect the lives of real people. Since all those involved in the
game are real and the effects that flow from their interactions are real, it is
of little importance that the experience of the virtual world is mediated
through computer technology and the Internet. Violations of basic
American principles should invite real-world courts to decide issues of
virtual rights.
B. Recent Legal Developments in Virtual Property Rights
To date, no virtual property rights case has been fully litigated in
America.54 Two interesting cases present a glimpse into the future of
virtual property litigation. The first involves a "point-and-click sweatshop"
started in Tijuana, Mexico, by the now defunct firm, Black Snow
Interactive. 55 A "point-and-click sweatshop" is based on the disparity in
labor value between first and developing nations. 6 In the virtual world of
EverQuest, the value of one man-hour stands at $3.42, meaning that one
hour of labor in the virtual environment will yield $3.42 in real-world
dollars. 8  Virtual labor consists of players moving in the online
environment, gathering virtual raw materials, such as virtual iron ore, and
then "farming" the materials into virtual chattels. 59 The virtual chattels can
either be sold in-world for in-world currency that can then be exchanged
for U.S. dollars, or the chattel can be sold in any real-world online auction
house such as eBay.60
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
52. See generally Goldman, supra note 43.
53. See generally id.
54. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 40, 50.
55. Id. at 39 (explaining that Black Snow Interactive paid unskilled Mexican workers to
play a videogame for long hours, and then sold the virtual assets they earned).
56. See id. at 38-39.
57. Id. at 35.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 37-38; see also David Barboza, Ogre To Slay? Outsource It To Chinese, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/08/business/
gaming.php (discussing the term "gold farmers" in the virtual world).
60. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 37-39.
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Black Snow Interactive seized on this potential and found real-world
labor for a lower cost than the value of one man-hour in the virtual world of
Dark Age of Camelot. 61  Mythic Interactive, the owner of Dark Age of
Camelot, attempted to prevent the commoditization of their world by
forcing eBay to remove all in-world virtual items from their auction listings
based upon a theory of intellectual property infringement.62 Black Snow
Interactive responded with a suit in federal court in California claiming
unfair business practice.63 Black Snow Interactive subsequently dissolved
as an organization and the litigation concluded with no precedential
value.64
A second example of a near-miss in American litigation of virtual
property rights arose out of Sony's desire to end EverQuest's
commoditization.65 A class action suit loomed over Sony, because of its
attempt to stop the sale of virtual chattels. 66 Sony applied pressure to eBay
to remove all auctions involving EverQuest virtual objects.67 The resulting
uproar and push for a class action lawsuit centered on the claim that,
although Sony owns the virtual item, the users own their time and labor
that procured the items. As such, the virtual items should be freely
alienable by the players. 68  Apparently, the class action suit never
developed and another opportunity to litigate this issue was lost.
69
Virtual worlds are highly popular in Asia.7 ° One in four teenagers in
South Korea currently subscribes to an online virtual world.71 Therefore, it
is not surprising that the first successfully completed litigation regarding
virtual property rights occurred in Asia.72 In 2003, a young man playing in
the virtual world of Hongyue, or Red Moon, became essentially invincible
61. Id. at 39.
62. Julian Dibbell, Serfing the Web, http://www.juliandibbell.com/texts/blacksnow.html
(last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Andrew Smith, Everquest Class Action Threat Over Auction Spat, THE REGISTER,
Jan. 25, 2001, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/01/25/everquest-class_actionthreatover/.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See generally id.
70. See Balkin, supra note 25, at 2043 n.1; see also Thomas Crampton, Actual Advertising
in a Virtual World, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 10, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/
articles/2006/04/09/business/game 10.php.
71. See Balkin, supra note 25, at 2043 n.1.
72. On-line Game Player Wins 1st Virtual Properties Dispute, XINHUA ONLINE, Dec. 19,
2003, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-12/19/content1240226.htm.
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through the purchase of thousands of hours of game play 73 and much hard
work stockpiling an overwhelming reserve of virtual biological weapons.v4
While he was not logged in, a hacker broke into his account and stole his
powerful weapons. 75  He approached the developer and requested the
identity of the thief, but the game developer refused his request. 76 He then
approached the police, but received no help. 7 Following this, he filed suit
in a Chinese court and won relief in the form of a return of the virtual
objects.78 Implicit in this ruling is that the player had a property right in the
virtual object that could be recognized in a real-world court.
These two examples illustrate the full bundle of property rights
normally applied to real-world property. Black Snow Interactive represents
the prototypical claim to manufacture and alienate virtual property.79 The
Red Moon example demonstrates exclusive possession of virtual
property.80 American courts are likely to face these types of virtual
property claims in the near future.
C. The Analytical Framework
How then are American courts likely to resolve these virtual property
disputes? While there are larger issues of fundamental human rights, such
as the right to privacy, liberty, and identity, implicated in the creation and
administration of virtual worlds, the U.S. Constitution protects these rights
from infringement only by state actors in the real-world.81 Corporations
that produce these virtual worlds are not state actors; therefore, they are not
82subject to the limitations on action imposed by real-world constitutions.
Thus, a corporation administrating a virtual world can abridge many rights
protected in the U.S. Constitution, such as limiting the content of speech.
However, this may not be entirely true.
Professor Jack Balkin suggests that the concept of a "company town,"
as described by the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Alabama,83 may apply to
73. Lawsuit Fires Up in Cases of Vanishing Virtual Weapons, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 20,
2003, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-11/20/content_283094.htm.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. On-line Game Player Wins 1st Virtual Properties Dispute, supra note 72.
78. Id.
79. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17 at 37-39.
80. Lawsuit Fires Up in Cases of Vanishing Virtual Weapons, supra note 73.
81. Balkin, supra note 25, at 2074-75.
82. Id.
83. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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virtual worlds.84 A company town is one in which a business privately
owns all of the spaces that have been considered public since time
immemorial, such as sidewalks and streets. Marsh establishes that private
businesses are held to the same standards for the protection of
constitutional rights in once-public spaces on grounds that the private actor
has become a state actor by usurping the traditional role of the state. 85
Thus, a business can only restrict speech on its privately-owned sidewalks
to the same extent that the state can limit speech on its public sidewalks.
86
Balkin argues that if an online virtual world owned by a for-profit
corporation fulfills all of the municipal functions that are normally
relegated to the state, the corporation is subject to the same constitutional
requirements as a state actor.87 Thus, the corporate developer of a virtual
world would be limited to constitutional standards in its ability to limit the
speech of its participants. This idea is intriguing, and some aspects of the
broader argument may find a greater degree of acceptance in courts as
virtual worlds become more commonplace in the lives of average citizens.
However, the argument is now fairly abstract. Courts will likely follow
standard contractual analysis and look to the outward manifestations of the
intent of the parties involved as revealed in the material terms of the
contract between them.88
1. Suggested Court Approaches to Virtual World License Agreements
There are two virtual world legal theorists whose approaches to the
resolution of virtual rights disputes are relevant and useful to real-world
courts, because the underpinnings of their theories rest on accepted real-
world contractual analysis. Both theories rest on the standard contractual
doctrine of court deferral to the reasonable expectations of the parties as
revealed in the material terms of the agreement between them.
First, Edward Castronova proposes a charter system for virtual worlds
similar to the charter system for corporations. 89 Virtual worlds predicated
as play spaces would be protected as such 9° under Castronova's scheme of
84. Balkin, supra note 25 at 2075-76.
85. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508.
86. Id.
87. Balkin, supra note 25, at 2076-78.
88. Frierson v. Delta Outdoor, Inc., 794 So.2d 220, 224 (Miss. 2001) ("In measuring the
rights of parties to a written contract which, on its face, is unambiguous and expresses an
agreement complete in all of its essential terms, the writing will control.").
89. Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 185, 204 (2004).
90. Id. at 201.
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the "Charter of Interration." 91  Castronova argues that virtual worlds
deserve special legal status similar to the way in which corporations exist
under the legal fiction of personhood.92 Corporations are allowed limited
liability, because of the generally positive effects limited liability produces
for society. 9 Castronova suggests that virtual worlds can potentially afford
society unique benefits that have not yet been recognized under current
socioeconomic legal structures.94 The ultimate benefit is the ability to
escape the work system paradigm established in the Industrial Revolution.
95
Because virtual worlds suggest such an enormous potential to provide a
good to society, the agreements by which these virtual worlds are regulated
deserve special status.9 6  Game spaces should essentially have the
equivalent of limited liability.
Under a "Charter of Interration," developers of a game world would
be free to make changes to the virtual world. These changes would be
impossible or highly expensive if a court could interfere, since players have
vested virtual property rights.97 For example, if a player purchases a virtual
sword for U.S. $1000 because the virtual sword is dominantly powerful,
the player would have the expectation that the sword would remain
powerful. However, after introducing the sword into the game
environment, the game developer may realize that the virtual sword is too
powerful. The sword may convey too much of an advantage to players
who wield it; therefore, the developer may choose to reduce the relative
power of the sword. Thus, a sword purchased for U.S. $1000 may now
only be worth U.S. $300 due to the sword's diminished power. The player
who purchased the virtual sword has now lost value because of the game
developer's decision. Under these conditions, a player might turn to a
court, praying for a return of the power to the sword or reimbursement for
the diminished value of the virtual object lost through the developer's
actions. Under Castronova's theory of "Charter of Interration," the game
developer could alter the potency of a particular weapon or character in a
virtual world to preserve balance in the game world's economic or combat
system, and players could not argue before a court that the developer's
alteration reduced the value of their virtual property.
91. Id. at 204.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 187.
94. See id. at 193.
95. Castronova, supra note 89, at 193 n.10.
96. Id. at 205; see, e.g., Miller, supra note 32, at 460.
97. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 72; see also Richard A. Bartle, Virtual
Worldlines: What the Imaginary Asks of the Real, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 19, 26-30 (2004).
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Virtual worlds that are not designated as play spaces by the
developers would not qualify for the "Charter of Interration" because they
fail to provide a unique good to society. 98 Again, the analogy to business
forms presents itself. The non-game world is much like a partnership,
which is not afforded limited liability for it does not produce a unique
benefit to the host society.99 Courts could enter these virtual worlds as
extensions of the real-world, because this type of virtual world does not
offer the potential benefit to society. 00 Thus, a court would be free to
balance the equity between developers and virtual world participants.
The esoteric idea of "Charters of Interration" differs little from
standard contractual analysis. In the EULA and ToS, the game developer
sets the rights and responsibilities of the developer and the virtual world
participant. Courts can look to the material terms of the agreement to
discern the reasonable expectations of the parties. 10 If the material terms
of the EULA or ToS establish a game space with a narrative through which
the virtual world participant can move, courts will likely read it as such,
providing the developer with control to modify and alter the virtual world
regardless of the professed virtual property interests of players.
Alternatively, if the material terms of the EULA and ToS establish a
collaborative environment where commoditized virtual objects are
exchanged for virtual or real currency, the court is likely to treat those
objects as it would any other object-subject to standard real-world
property law.
Though there is no legislation establishing Castronova's charter
system for virtual worlds, the reasoning behind Castronova's system likely
will be appealing to a court because of the similarity to foundational
contractual analysis. Therefore, each of the following two agreements
between virtual world developers and virtual world participants will be
analyzed under Castronova's concept of "Charters of Interration."
Jack Balkin shares a similar analysis with Castronova, but adds a
second tier of analysis for a court to pursue in the evaluation of a virtual
world EULA.'0 2 Balkin suggests that a virtual world that is set up as a
game space, but also fosters the free communication of ideas in a
collaborative environment, might justify state involvement in decisions
98. Castronova, supra note 89, at 204-05.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 200-01.
101. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1639 (2006); see, e.g., Bank of West v. Super. Ct., 2 Cal. 4th 1254
(1992).
102. See Balkin, supra note 25, at 2090.
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about the appropriateness of a developer's actions in limiting speech.,
0 3
Thus, in a virtual world where the developer is the creator of the world, but
players co-create the world through mutual interactions involving speech
and the interchange of virtual property, a court may be more inclined to
enter the virtual world and validate a player's property interest.
Conversely, in a virtual world where the developer is the author and players
merely travel down narrative paths laid out by the author, the court is likely
to find the virtual world a work of art subject to First Amendment speech
protections.1° 4 These protections would forbid a court from forcing a
change in the narrative by recognizing a player's virtual property
interest. 1
05
If the material terms of the agreement between the parties reveal a
reasonable expectation that the parties will be collaborating in the
development of the virtual world, a court will be apt to intervene in
balancing the virtual property interests of the parties. On the other hand, if
the material terms of the agreement reveal the intent of the developer that it
is the creator of the experience in the virtual world and the participant is
merely a passenger on narrative trails laid out by the developer, the court
will most likely not intervene to balance the virtual property interests of the
parties; instead, a court will likely defer to the authority of the EULA.
2. The Spectrum of Virtual World License Agreements
Players in large corporate online collaborative virtual worlds must
agree to a EULA and/or a ToS.10 6 These contracts govern the duties and
responsibilities of the signing parties. Courts are likely to defer to the will
of the parties as expressed in the terms of the contract as much as they
would in any other contractual analysis, including the implicit limitations
regarding contracts, such as adhesion and the doctrine of
unconscionability. 10 7 Thus, the specific provisions in these contracts take
on significant weight when analyzing how courts will approach property
and other virtual rights disputes. As is common in virtual world legal
analysis, the EULA is often assumed inapplicable so as to allow a deeper
analysis of the nature of virtual property and virtual rights. 10 8 Although the
process of assuming the unenforceability of the EULA is necessary to
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See Miller, supra note 32, at 460.
107. See Balkin, supra note 25, at 2071-72.
108. See Regulating Digital Environments, supra note 11, at 808.
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analyze the many different possible permutations that virtual rights might
take in the virtual space, the controlling effects of EULAs cannot
ultimately be ignored. The EULA is the framework and the lens through
which courts will look to judge the interests of the developers and
participants.10 9
Currently, different approaches are emerging in the way game
developers address virtual property rights through the EULA. The first
type of agreement strictly forbids the formation of any expectation of
virtual property rights. 110 A prominent example of this approach can be
found in Blizzard Entertainment's Terms of Use Agreement ("ToU")
governing the highly profitable virtual world, World of Warcraft
("WoW").111 The second type of contract form is a hybridized approach
employed in EverQuest II by Sony,'1 2 in their increasingly popular
incarnation of their strictly anti-commoditized game EverQuest.
113
EverQuest II's approach has been to strictly forbid the commoditization of
virtual goods through outside channels, while allowing commoditization
internally on Sony's service called "Station Exchange." ' 1 4 Thus, players
can create powerful in-world characters and goods which can then be sold
for real-world money on Station Exchange. What then are the rights of
players playing under these varied agreements?
III. ANALYSIS
A. World of Warcraft
World of Warcraft is a Tolkienesque fantasy online virtual
environment.115 This is a clear example of what would typically be called a
"game world." Game play centers on a player's avatar1 16 moving about a
three-dimensional virtual environment, acquiring skills in magic and
109. See generally id. at 807 (stating that the EULA generally defines the property rights).
110. See World of Warcraft Terms of Use Agreement, section 8, https://signup.
worldofwarcraft.comlagreement.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
111. Id.
112. See Sony Online Entertainment, EQ II UASL, http://eq2players.station.sony.com/en/
support article.vm?label=EQIIEULA (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
113. See EverQuest II-News, http://eq2players.station.sony.com/en/faq.vm (last visited
Sept. 28, 2006).
114. Station Exchange FAQ, What is Station Exchange?, http://stationexchange.station.
sony.com/faq.vm#WhatIsStationExchange (last visited Nov. 21, 2006).
115. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 15-20.
116. An avatar is the virtual representation of the player's body in the virtual world. Players
spend a great deal of time augmenting and refining their avatar. See id. at 6.
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combat and using those skills to defeat increasingly powerful
adversaries. 117 The virtual world of WoW is what is known as a "leveling
world." In leveling worlds, the object is to increase an avatar's abilities
through experience gained by fighting opponents.' 18 Blizzard's use of a
leveling system allows it to create an engaging, persistent world that users
will continue to play, thus allowing Blizzard to reap profits from monthly
flat rate subscription fees. 119 Under this business model, Blizzard is the
sole provider of content for this virtual world.1 20  The creation of that
content is increasingly expensive: "The primary business challenge we face
with art is that the costs for first-class art continue to rise faster than our
market is expanding, and the [Massively Multiplayer Online Game]s
require tremendously more art assets than the vast majority of standalone
games."
121
For WoW to retain monthly subscribers it must allow players of
different ability levels to move slowly, though pleasurably, through content
it creates at great expense.1 22 If high-level avatars were available on the
black market, players could bypass the drudgery of game play and purchase
the high-level character. 12 3 Blizzard reasons that low-level content would
not be used by players who could bypass it by purchasing a high-level
character, and would thus be less valuable because of external third party
virtual object transactions. 24 Further, more high-level content would need
to be created to keep high-level players interested and paying the monthly
subscription fee.
1 25
There is, of course, a logical contradiction here. If people pay
monthly subscriptions to play the game, why would they purchase high-
level characters or weapons that would essentially result in avoiding game
play for which they are paying? While this seems to facially contradict
Blizzard's understanding of player motivations, Richard Bartle suggests
two relevant reasons why players would choose to skip what they are
117. Id. at 26-28.
118. See id. at 26-27.
119. See Bartle, supra note 97, at 32.
120. See id. at 27.
121. Gordon Walton, Online Worlds Roundtable #8, Part 1, IGN.CoM, Oct. 22, 2003,
http://rpgvault.ign.com/articles/455/455832p2.html.
122. See Bartle, supra note 97, at 32 (suggesting that Blizzard develops leveled content to
maintain prolonged involvement with the virtual world, all the while collecting monthly
subscriptions).
123. Id. at 39-40.
124. Regulating Digital Environments, supra note 11, at 824-25.
125. Id.
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paying for.
12 6
The first reason is rational. Players purchase high-level characters so
that they may adventure successfully with friends who have been playing
within the game world for a longer amount of time, and thus have more
powerful, higher-level characters. 127 This may be reasonable, but it is
doubtful that this is a major motivating force behind the massive market for
advanced avatars and weapons.
The second reason, while less rational, is more likely the driving
force. Lower-level players buy higher-level avatars and weapons to appear
as if they are higher-level players. 128  This is understandable in a
competitive environment. It is further understandable that this behavior
would lead to a feedback loop, where players seeking an edge are
incentivized to go outside of the game to acquire that edge in a race for
excellence. Although there may be valid reasons for these motivations,
many players bypass game experiences through the out-of-world
acquisition of virtual objects.
129
In an attempt to protect their investment in the content that they have
developed, and to create a virtual environment that will continue to appeal
to players, WoW strictly forbids the buying and selling of virtual items
outside of the virtual game world. 130 In section 8 of WoW's ToU, Blizzard
sets forth their policy on outside transactions:
Note that Blizzard Entertainment either owns, or has exclusively
licensed, all of the content which appears in World of Warcraft. Therefore,
no one has the right to "sell" Blizzard Entertainments [sic] content, except
Blizzard Entertainment! So Blizzard Entertainment does not recognize any
property claims outside of World of Warcraft or the purported sale, gift or
trade in the "real world" of anything related to World of Warcraft.
Accordingly, you may not sell items for "real" money or exchange items
outside of World of Warcraft.' 31
Section 8, in conjunction with section 12 (regarding Termination),
deals a mighty blow to would-be virtual salespersons. "Blizzard
Entertainment reserves the right to terminate this Agreement without
notice, if, in Blizzard Entertainments [sic] sole and absolute discretion, you
fail to comply with any terms contained in these Terms of Use....132
126. See Bartle, supra note 97, at 39.
127. Id. at 39-40.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 39.
130. World of Warcraft Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 110.
131. Id.
132. Id. at section 12.
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Given that the ToU strictly disclaims a player's ability to sell WoW
property, it will likely be difficult to argue that players in this type of game
world could reasonably form the expectation that their labor in the
development of a high-level avatar could be alienable in any way.133
If enough players within the virtual world desire outside alienability
of virtual property, two opportunities to fulfill that desire easily present
themselves. First, players can organize en masse and force the game
developer to recognize their property rights. 134 The historical parallel to
King John and the forced signing of Magna Carta is readily apparent.
135
This approach is possible, though less likely, because virtual worlds are
fractious places. 136 It is doubtful a sufficiently broad consensus could be
formed to force a significant change in a corporation's business model for a
game. 137 Further, it could be difficult to organize such a movement within
an environment where communication between players is explicitly
monitored. 138  Organizers of such a movement could easily be removed
from the world via Blizzard's termination clause, found in section 12 of
their ToU. 3 9
Section 12 is broad enough to easily chill discussions that might
subject a player to termination. If players do not have recognized property
rights and they have not invested thousands of real-world dollars in a
particular world, they are more likely to forego the hassle of revolution and
simply leave the virtual world for another that better satisfies the players'
desires. 140 Blizzard is a for-profit corporation, and any serious threat to the
bottom line in the form of dwindling monthly subscriptions is likely to
produce a change in their expectations and business model. Thus, through
133. Id. at section 8.
134. See James Grimmelmann, The State of Play: On the Second Life Tax Revolt (Sept. 21,
2003), http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.phpname=News&file=article&
sid=1222 (detailing an organized tax revolt inside of a virtual world, which although successful,
produced only a modification to the preexisting structure of virtual land taxation and did not force
LindenLabs to reorganize their business model for Second Life).
135. See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, 7 (Transaction Publishers 2001).
136. See, e.g., Noveck, supra note 16, at 1 n.19.
137. See id. at n. 18 ("[T]he so-called tax revolt [is] much ado about nothing").
138. See World of Warcraft Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 110, at section 3(B)
(forbidding communication in Leetspeek, a web inspired textual dialect which thwarts
mechanized text filters employed by Blizzard to monitor in-world textual communication).
139. Id. at section 12.
140. See Posting of Justin to Control and Property in Play-Based Online Worlds,
http://www.gamegirladvance.com/mmog/archives/2002/10/2 1/strippingthedark fromdarkelf
_in eq.html (Oct. 21, 2002) (detailing players leaving EverQuest after Sony banned a player for
writing fan fiction on a private non-affiliated web site (excerpting Sandy Brundage, Stripping the
"Dark"from "Dark Elf' in EQ, GAMERS.COM, Oct. 9, 2000)).
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market forces, Blizzard will remain responsive to players' desires and
expectations.
1 41
As it stands, however, will WoW qualify for Castronova's Charter of
Interration? The answer is likely yes-through Blizzard's use of specific
language such as:
[N]o one has the right to "sell" Blizzard Entertainment content,
except Blizzard Entertainment! So Blizzard Entertainment does
not recognize any property claims outside of World of Warcraft
or the purported sale, gift or trade in the "real-world" of
anything related to World of Warcraft. Accordingly, you may
not sell items for "real" money or exchange items outside of
World of Warcraft. 
142
Accordingly, the rules that govern game play in World of Warcraft
are taken very seriously by Blizzard Entertainment."1 43 By disallowing any
real world transfers of WoW items, Blizzard has defined its world as a non-
commoditized game world. The specificity of the language will define for
a court the reasonable expectations of both Blizzard Entertainment and its
customers. 144 The virtual world is explicitly defined as a game world and
would convey Castronova's special benefit to society. Therefore, a court
will likely not intervene in a virtual property dispute based solely on
Castronova's Charter of Interration analysis.
Is WoW then the type of virtual world that still may necessitate real-
world court involvement based on Balkin's theory of collaborative virtual
environment? It is doubtful that a court would find WoW to be
collaborative. In section 3 of the ToU, Blizzard sets out the rules of
conduct for those existing within its virtual world. 1
45
As with all things, [WoW] is governed by certain rules of conduct
that must be adhered to by all users of [WoW]... Blizzard Entertainment
reserves the right to determine which conduct it considers to be outside the
spirit of the game and to take such disciplinary measures as it sees fit up to
and including termination and deletion of the Account.
146
Following this blanket statement are rules regarding players' names
141. See id.
142. World of Warcraft Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 110, at section 8.
143. Id. at section 3(C).
144. It is questionable that any significant portion of Wow's user base actually agrees to the
terms of the contract. This line of argument goes more to the impeachment of the reasoning of
Compuserve v. Patterson and its progeny. See Compuserve v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.
1996).
145. World of Warcraft Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 110, at section 3.
146. Id.
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with a high degree of specificity. A player may not incorporate in their
name terms that are "offensive,"'147 related to "cultural figure[s]"' 148 and
"pop culture icons"'149 belong to "religious figure[s] or deit[ies]"' 50 or are
derived from "character names from the Warcraft series of novels,"' 15' or
that relate to "drugs, sex, alcohol,"''
52 or are comprised of "gibberish,"' ' 53
utilize, "'Leet' or 'Dudespeak',' 54 or incorporate, "without limitation rank
titles ... monarchistic or fantasy titles ... and religious titles."' 55 Further,
a player may not misspell their name, or combine first and last names so as
to circumvent any of the above listed prohibitions. 56 Clearly, Blizzard
seeks to control the naming of characters in WoW. This is the first
example of Blizzard's attempt to retain control over every minute aspect of
the virtual world.
In section 3(B), Blizzard attempts to control all speech between
players in the virtual world: "Your Chat sessions may be subject to review,
modification, and/or deletion by Blizzard Entertainment without notice to
you.' 57 When communicating, players may not use any "offensive,"'
' 58
language, not limited to, anything that is "sexually, explicit, racially or,
ethnically... objectionable.' 59 Blizzard has made it clear that they retain
the right to monitor and limit all language and communication in the virtual
world. Through this high degree of control of the dialog between players,
the players appear to be less like active participants and more like
characters subject to the control of the author (Blizzard) of the piece.
In section 8, Blizzard expresses its desire to retain all rights to
WoW's virtual property: "you may not sell items for 'real' money or
exchange items outside of [WoW].' ' 60 Through this statement, it should be
clear to a player and court alike that Blizzard, through the ToU, intends to
retain control of its virtual property. Further, a player has no right to use
the virtual object, in any manner, outside of the WoW virtual world.
147. Id. at section 3(A)(2).
148. Id. at section 3(A)(4).
149. Id. at section 3(A)(1 1).
150. Id. at section 3(A)(6).
151. World of Warcraft Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 110, at section 3(A)(7).
152. Id. at section 3(A)(8).
153. Id. at section 3(A)(10).
154. Id. at section 3(A)(12).
155. Id. at section 3(A)(13).
156. Id. at section 3.
157. World of Warcraft Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 110, at section 3(B).
158. Id. at section 3(B)(i).
159. Id.
160. Id. at section 8.
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Finally, in section 3(C) of its user agreement, Blizzard details the
furthermost bounds of its control of behavior in WoW:
Game play is what [WoW] is all about. Accordingly, the rules that
govern game play in [WoW] are taken very seriously by Blizzard
Entertainment. Note that Blizzard Entertainment considers all valid play
161
styles in [WoW] to be part of the game....
What, though, are valid play styles? Section 3(C)(v) answers in the
negative: "[a]nything that Blizzard Entertainment considers contrary to the
'essence' of [WoW]," is not a valid play style. 162 Thus, Blizzard retains
absolute discretion over all virtual activity within WoW. Blizzard
recognizes that it must control the virtual world exclusively as an author to
maintain its revenue stream.
It is clear that WoW is not a collaborative environment. Blizzard
retains control over the forms of language used, names employed and
physical movement in the virtual space. A player in the world of WoW is a
passive participant, much like a movie viewer. Thus, under Balkin's
analysis, a court would be less likely to enter the virtual world because
Blizzard retains authorship and players have little recourse to argue that
they are co-creating the virtual world.
Thus, under Castronova's Charter of Interration, decisions by
Blizzard about the virtual rights of players within WoW should not be
reviewed by real-world courts because WoW qualifies as a play space.
Further, through Blizzard's usage of clear and consistent terms that
manifest its intent to control every aspect, including the names, objects,
language, and actions within the virtual world, it is clear to all parties that
Blizzard is the sole author of the work. Hence, WoW would not be seen as
a collaborative virtual environment. As such, it would not be subject to
Balkin's imposition of real-world scrutiny by courts.
Finally, at the level of basic contractual analysis, the clear intent of
the parties is manifested and easily discernable by the court. There can be
little doubt about the roles of the parties in the agreement. Players have
agreed not to buy or sell virtual objects outside of the virtual world of
WoW. They have agreed to allow Blizzard to monitor and control their
names, language, and movement. A court would, therefore, defer to the
express terms of the agreement and give Blizzard total control over the
virtual world of World of Warcraft.
161. Id. at section 3(C) (emphasis added).
162. Id. at section 3(C)(v).
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A. EverQuest H and the Introduction of Station Exchange
Sony-as a very large multinational corporation and owner of one of
the West's most popular and profitable Massively Multiplayer Online Role
Playing Games ("MMORPGs"), EverQuest and its recent reincarnation,
EverQuest II-shares many of Blizzard's concerns. If Sony was found to
be liable for any change to the game environment that negatively affected a
player's virtual property interest, such as making a powerful virtual sword
less so, Sony would be forced to balance the value of the player's
individual virtual property right against the value added to the game world.
Such computations would invariably favor stasis in the game environment
because the cost of changes that decrease the value of players' virtual
objects would be greater than the value added to the game world.
63
Therefore, Sony would unquestionably like to retain control of the game
world so that it can continue to develop a narrative that is balanced,
persistent, and compelling enough to retain high rates of monthly
subscriptions. Sony, however, has not taken the same course that Blizzard
has. Instead, Sony has adopted a hybrid approach to players' virtual
property interests. Sony recognizes players' virtual property interests, but
requires all commoditized virtual property exchanges to take place
exclusively on Sony's Station Exchange servers.164
Why would Sony recognize players' virtual property rights, and even
facilitate the exchange of virtual chattels, if it could stand to lose the legal
authority to control its creation? The first reason is to protect Sony's good
will through continued customer satisfaction. Sony claims that it is unable
to track virtual property transactions that originate outside of the virtual
world. 165 When disputes arise from a transacting party's failure to perform,
Sony faces "an enormous customer service nightmare" 166 determining who
is entitled to what virtual property. Sony argues that if all transactions in
virtual EverQuest II property transpire on its Station Exchange servers,
Sony can track and verify all transactions. This way, Sony can ensure
performance on all contracts, thus eliminating fraud and thereby generating
heightened customer satisfaction.
67
163. Regulating Digital Environments, supra note 11, at 807, 826.
164. Station Exchange FAQ, What Is Station Exchange?, http://stationexchange.station.
sony.com/faq.vm.
165. See Regulating Digital Environments, supra note 11, at 807, 822.
166. Id.
167. See Station Exchange FAQ, Why Are You Offering This Service?,
http://stationexchange.station.sony.com/faq.vm.
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Further, Sony recognizes that a significant portion of their users
desires commoditized game environments.1 68  Players' insistence on
trading virtual goods, even with the looming threat of being expelled from
the virtual world, reveals the extent of players' desire for commoditized
virtual goods. Past efforts to restrict the practice of commoditized
exchanges of virtual property have resulted in rumblings of class-action
lawsuits, marginalized players, and, at worst, extirpated paying
customers. 1
69
Sony seems to have reached a compromise position. Players who
object to commoditized game environments can play in worlds without the
intrusion of real-world economic forces, while those who wish to bypass
disagreeable game content can exist in a separate, commoditized virtual
world where virtual goods and characters are freely available for purchase
on Sony's Station Exchange servers. 170 This broad appeal to diametrically-
opposed factions of players ensures Sony's ability to increase customer
satisfaction and market share. Wholly non-commoditized game worlds
such as WoW can only directly appeal to the non-commoditized faction of
players, while those who desire virtual property exchanges remain
marginalized, conducting virtual goods transactions in out-of-world, fraud-
prone black markets, constantly subject to expulsion if detected.
There is a second reason, beyond customer satisfaction, that likely
motivated Sony's decision to commoditize EverQuest II-the profitability
of virtual trade. 17  Sony charges a one dollar listing fee for every item
listed, and collects ten percent of every transaction.1 72  While Sony
previously condemned the third-party market in virtual property exchange,
it has now internalized this market in order to reap the profit.
Has Sony then acted in accordance with Castronova's theory of
Interration and allowed the law into its once pure, now commoditized game
world? By acknowledging the existence of saleable virtual property and
directly profiting from its existence, Sony has opened itself to equitable
arguments that players can develop a stake in the fruits of their labor by
developing virtual goods. In an attempt to avoid liability for harm to
players' virtual property, Sony strictly disclaims any right of a player to
168. See id.
169. EverQuest Class Action Threat Over Auction Spat, THE REGISTER, Jan. 25, 2001,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/01/25/everquest-classactionthreatover/.
170. See What Is Station Exchange?, supra note 164.
171. See Alexs Krotoski, Life: Online: Real Profits from Play Money: Julian Dibbell Set
Out to Make a Mint Selling Virtual Goods-and He Succeeded, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Apr.
15, 2004, at 21.
172. What Is Station Exchange?, supra note 164.
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establish a virtual property interest:
YOU PROMISE, THEREFORE, THAT YOU WILL NEVER
ASSERT OR BRING ANY CLAIM OR SUIT AGAINST SOE
[Sony Online Entertainment], ITS LICENSOR(S), ANY SONY
COMPANY, OR ANY EMPLOYEES OF ANY OF THE
ABOVE, WHICH IS RELATED TO OR BASED ON (I) A
CLAIM THAT YOU "OWN" ANY VIRTUAL GOODS IN
ANY GAME, (II) A CLAIM FOR THE "VALUE" OF
VIRTUAL GOODS IF SOE DELETES THEM (AND/OR
TERMINATES YOUR ACCOUNT(S)... (III) A CLAIM FOR
THE "VALUE" OF VIRTUAL GOODS THAT YOU MAY
LOSE IF SOE DOES ANYTHING THAT IT IS ENTITLED
TO DO PURSUANT TO ANY PROVISION OF THE
EXCHANGE AGREEMENT, THIS AGREEMENT, THE
GAME'S RULES OF CONDUCT, SOE'S TERMS OF
SERVICE AND/OR (IV) A CLAIM THAT THE "VALUE" OF
ANY VIRTUAL GOODS HAS INCREASED OR
DECREASED BY VIRTUE OF ANY GAME
MODIFICATION THAT SOE HAS MADE OR WILL MAKE.
ALL OF THE ABOVE APPLIES WHETHER ON AN
EXCHANGE ENABLED SERVER OR ON A NON-
EXCHANGE ENABLED SERVER.173
Here, Sony is attempting to have it both ways. Sony seeks to retain
control of the game narrative by explicitly retaining the ability to delete or
modify virtual property at any time, while profiting from the exchange of
virtual goods on its servers.1 74 Sony seems to rely exclusively on the
protection it hopes is afforded by the EULA. 17
5
In Section (I), the EULA attempts to prevent a player from forming
the expectation of "owning" virtual property by expressly denying a
player's ability to do so. 176 Ownership of property implies the standard
bundle of ownership rights, such as "the right to possess, to enjoy the
income from, to alienate, or to recover ownership from one who has
173. EQ II UASL, supra note 112.
174. Id. ("You agree that SOE retains the unfettered right to modify its games and all aspect
of characters, items and coin (collectively, 'Virtual Goods') therein.... You further acknowledge
that SOE can and will, in its discretion, modify features, functions or abilities of any element of
the game or any Virtual Goods (which may, among other things, make the Virtual Goods
substantially more effective or functional, or less effective or function, more common or less
common, or eliminated entirely).").
175. SOE refers to its EULA as UASL, or "User Agreement and Software License."
176. EQ II UASL, supra note 112.
20061
82 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:59
improperly obtained title. ,,177 Players who exist and purchase virtual
objects on Sony's Station Exchange servers have the ability to use, possess,
and enjoy the income provided by the virtual object.
178
The final right in the bundle-the ability to exclude others or to
recover ownership if improperly taken-is more complex. In the virtual
property context, the right to exclude has two possible implications. The
first implication refers to virtual objects taken by players inside the game
world. Looting corpses is a common practice in the game world.
179
Players seek out weaker players and kill them in the game environment for
the experience awarded in the combat and to acquire the player's virtual
objects.18 0 If this activity were performed in the real world, it would likely
be punishable by death, but within the game world, this practice is
common. 8 1 The extent of a player's ability to exclude others is determined
by the player's power within the game world. 82 Therefore, it is reasonable
for a player to expect that a virtual object purchased through Sony's Station
Exchange may be lost through ordinary game play. In this case, a court
would not likely order the return of the virtual object because the object
was lost through game mechanics.'
83
The second implication of the ability to exclude refers to actions
taken outside of the mechanics of game play. A player may lose a
purchased virtual object through the real-world efforts of hackers. 84 If a
hacker breaches Sony's security and transfers a virtual object into another
account, a player's reasonable expectation of ownership would be violated.
Basic common law principles suggest that Sony would be responsible for
the return of the virtual object to the rightful owner.' 85 This is the scenario
seen in the first successfully litigated virtual property case in China. 86 A
court would be more inclined to order the return of the virtual object
because the object was lost outside of the game world or beyond game
mechanics. Accordingly, Sony recognizes all of the essential elements of
property ownership, but still disclaims a player's ability to form the
177. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 3 (1997).
178. What Is Station Exchange?, supra note 164.
179. See generally Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 33.
180. See id. at 18-19.
181. Id.
182. EQ II UASL, supra note 112.
183. See generally Tim Guest, Just a Game?, NEW SCIENTIST, May 20, 2006, at 38.
184. See John Steinbachs, Virtual Theft Causes Real Pain; On-Line Gamer Calls Cops After
Hacker Steals Character, THE OTTAWA SUN, Apr. 28, 2002, at 20; Karen Deame, Hackers
Plunder Games Booty, THE AUSTRALIAN, Jun. 6, 2006, at 36.
185. Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U.L REV. 1047, 1084-85 (2005).
186. See On-line Game Player Wins 1st Virtual Properties Dispute, supra note 72.
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ownership interest.
Section (II) of the EULA prevents a player from forming the
expectation of owning the value of the virtual good. "YOU PROMISE,
THEREFORE, THAT YOU WILL NEVER ASSERT... ANY
CLAIM... AGAINST SOE... BASED ON... THE 'VALUE' OF
VIRTUAL GOODS IF SOE DELETES THEM ....
Section (III) of the EULA attempts to prevent the player from
forming the expectation that the purchased virtual good will retain its value
and seeks to ensure that Sony has the latitude to adjust the virtual item and
virtual world as it sees fit in order to maintain a profitable game experience
for its users: "YOU PROMISE, THEREFORE, THAT YOU WILL
NEVER ASSERT ... ANY CLAIM... AGAINST SOE... BASED
ON... A CLAIM ... FOR THE 'VALUE' OF VIRTUAL GOODS THAT
YOU MAY LOSE IF SOE DOES ANYTHING THAT IT IS ENTITLED
TO DO ....
Lastly, in Section (IV), Sony disclaims the player's ability to claim
the value of virtual goods through game modification: "YOU PROMISE,
THEREFORE, THAT YOU WILL NEVER ASSERT... ANY
CLAIM... AGAINST SOE... BASED ON... A CLAIM... THAT
THE 'VALUE' OF ANY VIRTUAL GOODS HAS INCREASED OR
DECREASED BY VIRTUE OF ANY GAME MODIFICATION THAT
SOE HAS MADE OR WILL MAKE."
189
Under Castronova's scheme of Interration, it seems that Sony has
invited the intrusion of real-world courts. 190 Since Sony profits from the
exchange of virtual goods and essentially recognizes virtual goods as an
exchangeable commodity, 19' a real-world court is likely to apply more
scrutiny to Sony's EULA. The game space is not a pure game space, but a
hybrid, and as a result, the virtual world is likely to receive only limited
protection from the intrusion of real-world courts.
Assuming, arguendo, that EverQuest II is ineligible for Castronova's
Charter of Interration, there are still material terms within the contract that
a court will examine when deciding whether to enter the virtual space.
From the above-quoted EULA sections, it is clear that virtual objects have
real-world value. Sony disclaims, however, players' ability to form an
expectation in that value, and players must agree that they will not expect
187. EQ II UASL, supra note 112.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Castronova, supra note 89, at 204.
191. What Is Station Exchange?, supra note 164.
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to retain the value of virtual objects.192 Therefore, when changes are made
by Sony to the virtual world that affect the value of a player's virtual
objects, the court will likely be unwilling to award damages to a player
because of the material terms of the contract. Further, if a player loses a
valuable virtual object through game play, the court is also unlikely to
award damages due to deference to the contract and to the reasonable
expectation of the parties.
As the mechanism that decreases the value of the virtual object moves
away from the game space, the court will be increasingly likely to enter the
virtual space and restore the value lost by players. The Red Moon example
from China is the representative scenario. There, the court ordered the
return of virtual objects because an external force from outside of the game
space, a hacker, depleted the value of the virtual objects within the virtual
space.' 93 In such a case, a court is likely to look beyond the contract,
because such interference likely does not meet the player's reasonable
expectation that their account is secure from outside intrusion. In this case,
Sony may be liable for lost value to virtual objects.
Given that Sony employs a hybrid approach, the application of
Castronova's Charter of Interration is indeterminate. In a subset of
scenarios, a court may enter the virtual space to balance the equities of
players and developers. Balkin's collaborative game environment analysis
will arguably apply because Sony's EULA does not manifest the necessity
to control the game environment to the same extent that Blizzard did in the
WoW example noted above. Section 12 of Sony's EULA states: "[Y]ou
have no expectation of privacy in any such communications and expressly
consent to such monitoring of communications you send and receive."'
' 94
Here, it seems Sony's desire to monitor communication is not centered on
creating an immersive experience or controlling the game narrative. Sony
does not attempt to control the language, naming, or virtual physical
behavior in the virtual world. Consequently, a court is more likely to see
EverQuest II as a collaborative game environment where the game
developer and the players co-create the narrative. Due to this entangled
involvement, a player may develop a degree of equity in the virtual world.
At a minimum, this may weigh slightly in favor of a court peering into the
virtual world to balance the equities of the players and developers.
Sony's hybrid approach frustrates the use of Castronova's Charter of
Interration analysis because some elements of the game world are pure
192. EQ II UASL, supra note 112.
193. See On-line Game Player Wins 1st Virtual Properties Dispute, supra note 72.
194. EQ II UASL, supra note 112.
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game play, while other elements are commoditized. This approach is likely
to be unpersuasive to a court. Further, Balkin's approach of a collaborative
environment is also largely indeterminate, though it may weigh slightly in
favor of court involvement in the virtual world. The controlling analysis
that a real-world court is likely to use in EverQuest II's virtual world is
traditional contract analysis. This analysis is likely to conclude that in a
majority of situations, Sony should not be liable for loss in value of virtual
objects, with the caveat that, as the mechanism that decreases value moves
away from the game space and game mechanics, the court will be
increasingly willing to enter the game space and possibly award damages
for the loss in value to virtual objects.
IV. CONCLUSION
Virtual worlds are becoming more important in the lives of average
citizens. These virtual worlds produce real effects in the real world. As the
financial impact of these virtual worlds continues to increase, the impetus
for real-world courts to involve themselves with virtual matters will grow.
Game developers are trying different approaches to modulate the effect that
real-world courts will have on their virtual spaces. Some completely forbid
an expectation of virtual property interests in the game environment.
Others, like Sony, attempt to accommodate players' interest in
commoditization without losing control over the virtual space they have
created. While it is unclear exactly how courts will tackle these issues, it is
certain courts will have to address them in the near future. The burgeoning
legal and economic analysis of virtual worlds provides a hope that when a
court in America does actually delve into these uncharted territories, it will
not be without the guidance of many great thinkers.
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